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that the state had a substantial interest
in regulating the activity and 2) that the
law was tailored in a reasonable man-
ner to serve the state's interests without
overly restricting the protected speech.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm 'n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). The Court
found that the Board failed to meet the
second requirement of the Central
Hudson test.
The Board argued that the ban pro-
tected several substantial interests. It
asserted that the ban ensured that con-
sumers were not being misled by fraudu-
lent statements. It also contended that
the ban protected consumers' privacy
interests by preventing persistent CPAs
from overreaching and using aggres-
sive tactics. Furthermore, the Board
argued that the ban was necessary to
maintain the fact and appearance of
CPA independence. The Board rea-
soned that solicitation would compro-
mise the independence necessary to
audit fairly a business or attest to its
financial statements because a CPA in
need of business might be prone to
ethical lapses. Finally, the Board ar-
gued that the public perception of CPAs
as independent would be undermined
by lifting the ban.
Interests Not Directly Served By Ban
The Court acknowledged that the
state's interests were substantial. Nev-
ertheless, the ban failed the second
prong of the CentralHudson test, which
required a regulation impinging on com-
mercial expression to advance the state's
interest directly. The Court noted that
the Board presented no evidence to
support its contentions that in-person
solicitation by CPAs would lead to
fraud, overreaching, or compromised
independence. In fact, studies in the
field indicated that such consequences
were unlikely. Furthermore, the Court
pointed out that the blanket ban was
over-inclusive, preventing in-person
solicitation by honest CPAs as well as
fraudulent or overbearing CPAs.
The Board argued in the alternative
that the ban constituted a reasonable
restriction on the manner in which CPAs
may communicate with prospective cli-
ents rather than a direct regulation of
the commercial speech itself. In reject-
ing that argument, the Court noted that,
even if the ban were a content-neutral
time, place, or manner restriction on
speech, the ban would still fail to serve
the state's interests in an effective or
direct way, and thus could not be up-
held.
Prophylactic Rule Unnecessary
Finally, the Board argued that a total
ban on CPA solicitation was necessary
because the solicitation usually occurred
in private offices where it would be
difficult to regulate or monitor. The
Board relied on Ohralik v. Ohio State
BarAss'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978), which
upheld a ban on all in-person solicita-
tion by lawyers.
The Court distinguished the instant
case from Ohralik. The Court pointed
out that lawyers, trained in the art of
persuasion, usually deal with unin-
formed and perhaps desperate clients.
In contrast, CPAs approach experienced
business executives who have the time
and resources to evaluate a CPA's offer
of services. The Court concluded that,
given the differences in clientele, so-
licitation by lawyers is more likely to
lead to misconduct than solicitation by
CPAs, and thus a blanket ban on CPA
solicitation is unnecessary.
Blackmun Disapproves Intermediate
Scrutiny
Justice Blackmun joined the Court's
opinion but wrote separately to voice
his disapproval of the majority's find-
ing that commercial speech free from
fraud or duress is entitled to only an
intermediate level of First Amendment
protection.
O'Connor Criticizes Majority's Focus
as Too Narrow
Justice O'Connor found the Court's
focus on whether the object of the so-
licitation may be harmed to be too nar-
row. According to Justice O'Connor,
the state has the broader authority to
prohibit commercial speech which,
though harmless to the listener, may be
damaging to the reputation of the
speaker's profession. She also analo-
gized the case to Ohralik, because at-
torneys as well as CPAs have profes-
sional expertise that can be used to
mislea-l or coerce a naive potential cli-
ent. Finally, she contended that the
majority avoided analyzing the actual
ban under Central Hudson by improp-
erly casting the case as an "as-applied"
challenge even though the ban applied
to all CPAs. She read the majority
opinion as implying that the ban satis-
fies Central Hudson by virtue of its
failure to state otherwise. Accordingly,
Justice O'Connor would reverse the
lower court and uphold the ban on so-
licitation. 80
Jennifer C. Clarke
Insurer May Deny
Coverage for Artificial
Heart Transplant
In Loyola Univ. of Chicago v.
Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895 (7th
Cir. 1993), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that an insurer which denied coverage
for an artificial heart implant reason-
ably interpreted its policy's exclusions.
The court found that the insurer did not
waive its requirement of obtaining prior
approval before a subsequent human
heart transplant could be covered and
held that the insurer could rely on this
requirement when denying coverage.
The Insurance Policy
Billy Via, a 44-year-old, was a quali-
fied participant under a group health plan
provided by Humana Insurance Com-
pany (Humana). After suffering a heart
attack, he was admitted to Loyola Univer-
sity Medical Center (Loyola) on July 9,
1988, to undergo coronary artery bypass
surgery. Prior to his surgery, Via assigned
the benefits under his health plan to Loyola.
Humana authorized his admission to
Loyola for seven days of care.
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After surgery on August 3, 1988,
Via could not be weaned from the car-
diac bypass machine. Via's surgeon
had two options: allow him to die or
implant a Jarvik-7 artificial heart until
a human heart became available for
transplant. The surgeon implanted the
Jarvik-7. On September 5, 1988, Via
received a human heart. Nonetheless,
he died two weeks later.
At first, Humana refused to cover
any of Via's hospitalization at Loyola.
About 6 months after the lawsuit was
filed, however, Humana agreed to pay
for all medical expenses incurred prior
to the Jarvik-7 implant. In a letter to
Loyola, the vice-president of medical
affairs at Humana stated that Humana
would not cover the Jarvik-7 implant
because it was experimental. Humana
would also deny coverage for the sub-
sequent human heart transplant because
it had decided that Via did not meet
Medicare guidelines for a good trans-
plant candidate.
The "Major Transplant Benefit
Rider" to the health plan stated in rel-
evant part:
[W]e will pay benefits ... for cov-
ered major transplant expenses ...
incurred by an insured person for
an approved major transplant.
For a major transplant procedure
to be considered approved ... prior
approval from our Medical Af-
fairs Department in advance of
the procedure is required. Such
approval will be based on written
criteria and procedures estab-
lished by our MedicalAffairs
Department ... If approval is not
given, benefits will not be pro-
vided for the procedure.
No benefit is payable for or in
connection with a major trans-
plant if: 1. Our Medical Affairs
Department is not contacted for
prior authorization of the proce-
dure. 2. Our Medical Affairs
Department does not approve
coverage for the procedure ...
based on a determination that the
procedure is experimental for the
condition involved.
Loyola brought suit under the Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1),
for recovery of expenses associated
with the artificial and human heart trans-
plants. These expenses totaled approxi-
mately $500,000. The United States
District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois granted Humana's motion
for summary judgment and denied
Loyola's cross-motion for partial sum-
mary judgment. Loyola subsequently
appealed the district court ruling.
The Standard of Review
Although Loyola argued for a de
novo standard of review, the Seventh
Circuit found that the district court's
choice of the arbitrary and capricious
standard was appropriate. This stan-
dard applies if the administrator's dis-
cretion is unrestrained or limited only
by the requirement of good faith. Un-
der the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, the denial of benefits must be
based on a reasonable interpretation of
the insurance plan documents. In addi-
tion, the administrator must make an
informed judgment and articulate an
explanation in light of relevant facts.
Under these circumstances, the
administrator's decision is final and the
denial of benefits will not be overruled.
The Seventh Circuit held that the
plan gave Humana's Medical Affairs
Department (Department) discretion in
establishing the criteria for coverage
and in applying the criteria to each
patient's case. The court acknowledged
that the Humana plan did not contain
any "magic words" granting discretion
to the plan administrator. The court
noted, however, that the Major Trans-
plant Benefit Rider provided that prior
approval from the Department was re-
quired for a heart transplant to be cov-
ered and that such approval was to be
based on written criteria and proce-
dures established by the Department.
Furthermore, the plan provided that
benefits would not be payable if the
Department determined that the proce-
dure was experimental for the condi-
tion involved. Other portions of the
plan specifically excluded experimen-
tal procedures as determined by the
company and gave Humana the author-
ity to interpret the meaning of "experi-
mental."
Necessary Treatment Can Still Be
Experimental
In arguing that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the
Jarvik-7 was "experimental for the con-
dition involved," Loyola claimed that
Via's artificial heart implant was not an
experiment. Instead, Loyola maintained
that the implant surgery was a success-
ful bridge to the transplant of a human
heart and was done to save Via's life.
The Seventh Circuit explained that a
procedure could be medically neces-
sary and still be experimental. The
court noted that even Loyola's experts
testified that use of the Jarvik-7 was
experimental, and that the handbook
and consent form given to Jarvik-7 pa-
tients by Loyola described the artificial
heart's use as part of an experimental
study. In finding that no issue of mate-
rial fact existed, the court stated that the
experimental nature of the Jarvik-7
implant was not diminished simply be-
cause implantation "was the only choice
and happened to be successful."
Requirement of Prior Approval Not
Waived for Human Heart Transplant
In its next argument, Loyola asserted
that Humana waived its requirement of
prior approval for the human heart trans-
plant, and therefore should cover this
portion of Via's expenses. Loyola con-
ceded that it had not obtained prior
approval, and offered two reasons in
support of the waiver argument.
First, Loyola claimed that the prior
approval requirement was waived be-
cause Humana did not use lack of prior
approval as a basis for denying cover-
age in its denial-of-benefits letter.
Noting that waiver is "a voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a known
right," the court rejected Loyola's ar-
gument that the omission constituted a
Volume 6 Number 1 /Fall 1993 25
I Recent Cases
waiver. The court found that nothing
in Humana's letters suggested that
Humana intended to surrender the right
to enforce other provisions of its policy.
Moreover, in a letter to Via's widow,
Humana referred to the lack of prior
notification when it explained its denial
of benefits.
Second, Loyola contended that a
Humana employee told Loyola em-
ployee Cynthia Sepkowski that Humana
would not make a determination about
coverage until the final billing. Loyola
argued that the difference in what
Humana told Sepkowski and Humana's
position in court created an issue of fact
as to whether the Humana employee's
statement resulted in waiver.
In rejecting this second argument,
the court held that even accepting
Loyola's version of the facts, the
Humana employee's statement did not
establish a waiver. In examining
Humana's conduct, the court noted that
the transplant case specialist at
Humana's Department of Medical Af-
fairs had on three separate occasions
informed Loyola of the prior approval
requirement and requested documenta-
tion of Via's condition and diagnosis.
The court found that these actions
throughout Via's hospitalization dem-
onstrated Humana's intent to adhere to,
not waive, the requirement of prior ap-
proval.
Estoppel Claim Also Fails
Loyola also asserted an estoppel
claim, arguing that the statement from
the Humana employee to Sepkowski
prevented Loyola from seeking public
assistance for Via's care. At the time
Via was hospitalized, Loyola had a con-
tract with the Illinois Department of
Public Aid, which provided benefits for
transplant patients. Under Illinois law,
a patient could not qualify for public
aid if the patient had substantial assets
or private medical insurance. Loyola
claimed that because Humana refused
to make a determination about cover-
age, Via was deprived of the chance to
spend his assets and thus qualify for
public aid.
The Seventh Circuit found that
Loyola's claim was inconsistent with
its actions, because Loyola showed no
reliance on Humana's actions. The
court further concluded that Humana
never suggested to Loyola that it would
cover the transplants. "[E]stoppel oc-
curs when one party knowingly mis-
represents or conceals a material fact
and the other party, not knowing the
truth, reasonably relies on that misrep-
resentation or concealment to his detri-
ment." The court concluded there was
no misrepresentation or concealment.
The facts showed that Sepkowski was
told that "there was no guarantee of
payment for anything," and two weeks
later, Sepkowski herself noted on the
billing records that she was checking
on the status of coverage. Thus, the
court maintained that if Loyola truly
believed that no further action was nec-
essary until final billing, Sepkowski
would not have checked on the status of
coverage. Moreover, Loyola's assump-
tion that Humana would make a cover-
age determination at a later date was
unreasonable. Finally, even if Loyola
did not assume coverage, it was not
prevented from attempting to obtain
public aid.
Humana's Humanity Not the Issue
In its final argument, Loyola main-
tained that Humana should at least pay
for basic hospital expenses and other
care given to Via after his operations.
Loyola focused on Humana's seem-
ingly overlapping and inconsistent rea-
sons for denying coverage for parts of
Via's care. Humana denied coverage
for all of Via's hospital expenses after
the Jarvik-7 implant because it believed
those expenses were connected to an
experimental procedure and thus were
excluded by the Major Transplant Ben-
efit Rider. Additionally, Humana spe-
cifically denied coverage for the hu-
man heart transplant because Loyola
had not obtained prior approval for the
procedure. Loyola questioned
Humana's concern over prior approval
for the human heart transplant when the
transplant simply could have been de-
nied as an expense related to the experi-
mental Jarvik-7 implant.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that
Humana was justified in denying cov-
erage for portions of Via's heart trans-
plant care. Under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, health benefits may
be denied based on a reasonable inter-
pretation of the language in the health
plan. In Via's case, Humana denied
him benefits for expenses incurred af-
ter the insertion of the Jarvik-7. The
Seventh Circuit found this determina-
tion reasonable.
Although Via's health plan expressly
included post-discharge services, sup-
plies, care and treatment falling within
the definition of "major transplant," the
policy's exclusion clause denied cov-
erage for "experimental" procedures.
Since Via first received the "experi-
mental" Jarvik-7, Humana found that
he would not have needed the human
heart transplant if he had not been kept
alive by the Jarvik-7. Thus, Humana
concluded that both the Jarvik-7 im-
plant and the subsequent human heart
transplant were "experimental" and
denied Via coverage on that basis. In
the Court's view, Humana reasonably
interpreted the language of the health
plan and was justified in denying Via
coverage for the hospital expenses in-
curred after the Jarvik-7 implant.
The court acknowledged that
Humana appeared to be telling Via "we
will not cover you because you should
be dead." Nonetheless, the court could
not render a judgment based solely on
the morality of Humana's actions. The
court's role in a contract case such as
this one was to examine the language of
the benefit plan, and determine whether
Humana reasonably interpreted it. The
court determined that Humana did so.
Loyola surgeons were free to perform
procedures to save Via's life, but Humana
was not required to pay for them. *
Caryn R. Suder
26 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
I Recent Cases
